

The portfolio held up better than the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Year Government/Credit Index in Q1 and has outpaced the index since its inception. As always, our goal is to outperform the index over a full market cycle, while generating a yield advantage relative to the index.

As we turned the calendar on a full year of an unprecedented global pandemic and financial market uncertainty, climbing interest rates became the main story in Q1. Dashing the country's hopes of a fresh start after a surreal year of toilet paper hoarding, mask wearing, lockdowns and virus surges, the country began the new year witnessing an assault on the nation's capital that left the world shaken. But even as the political world found its stability with an uneventful inauguration of a new administration, fixed income markets delivered a sharp blow to investors.

Fueled by a euphoric mix of accelerated vaccine distribution, expectations for an end to quarantines, two stimulus packages and a re-opening of the national economy, markets began to rotate in anticipation of a juggernaut economy. With those expectations came a meteoric increase in longer term interest rates, as the 10-year Treasury increased 83 basis points (bps) and the 30-year Treasury increased 77 bps. From a historic standpoint, the absolute shift in yield for the 10-year Treasury ties as the ninth largest quarterly move higher since the early 1980s. While the anticipation of a surging economy was partially due to the aforementioned developments, there were some technical aspects to consider as well:

- Banks and insurers in Japan and Korea were selling longer dated U.S. Treasuries as they prepared for their new fiscal year, which begins in April. In February, the biggest moves higher in longer-dated Treasury yields occurred during Asia trading hours.
- February's 7-year Treasury auction was the worst received auction of that tenor on record. The auction delivered the longest tail for a 7-year auction on record (since 2009). The tail is the difference between the average yield (1.151% in February) and the high yield (1.195%) for the bond being auctioned. A wide, or long, tail means there was diminished interest in the bond at the initial level, forcing the yield higher to attract interest. The dramatic shift that occurred on auction day (February 25) was felt across the long end of the curve, with

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
the 10-year Treasury reaching a high-low spread of 23.6 bps intraday before settling higher by 10.4 bps. The belly of the curve, the 5-year and 7-year, took the biggest hit with the 5-year higher by 21.9 bps and the 7-year higher by 19.3 bps.

- Duration hedging. As interest rates climb higher, mortgage duration (sensitivity to interest rate movements) increases, as lower coupon mortgages become less likely to prepay or refinance, which would expose borrowers to higher borrowing costs. Investors holding these mortgages often sell longer duration Treasuries to lower their overall portfolio duration, thus creating a vicious circle that pushes Treasury rates higher which in turn causes mortgage durations to extend.
- Supplemental leverage ratio expiration. During the early days of the crisis, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the FDIC issued rule 85 FR 32980, an 11-page document that permitted global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) to increase their U.S. Treasury holdings without concern for violating the supplementary leverage ratio (SLR) to be considered well capitalized. This was one of many steps taken by the U.S. government to help stabilize the financial markets during the pandemic. As consumers and businesses raised cash through the sale of securities, accessed credit lines/debt to build cash reserves, or the reception of stimulus, deposit levels at financial institutions continued to grow, increasing the size of institutions' balance sheets. Without adjusting the SLR, the resulting increase in the size of the depository institutions' balance sheets could have caused a sudden and significant increase in the regulatory capital needed to meet a depository institution's leverage ratio requirement. Having served its purpose during the crisis, the government allowed the SLR exemption to expire on March 31 of this year. As financial institutions adjusted their balance sheets by liquidating Treasury positions in anticipation of the expiration, this could have contributed to the increase in longer duration Treasury rates.



The impact of this historic move higher in interest rates was felt across fixed income markets, as longer duration assets felt the brunt of the impact. Duration is a measure of the sensitivity of the price of a bond or other debt instrument to a change in interest rates—the longer the duration of a bond, the more sensitive that bond is to interest rate movements. Exhibit 1 outlines the return trajectory for a variety of fixed income indices, including the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index, Treasury Index, Securitized Index, Corporate Index and the ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index. The corporate index delivered the worst performance during the quarter (-4.65%) with a duration at nearly 8.48 years at the end of Q1. The Treasury index lost -4.25% and ended the quarter with a duration of 6.79 years. The shorter duration (4.15 years) securitized index mitigated some of the impact from rising rates, only losing -1.18% quartering Q1. While the ICE BofA U.S. High Yield Index ended the quarter with a duration of 4.05 years, it was able to offset the principal impact of the rate move with higher yield.

EXHIBIT 1: Q1 2021 RETURNS



Source: Bloomberg, as of 3/31/21.

The Federal Reserve continued to hold firm on its outlook for the economy, inflation, quantitative easing, and the future path of interest rates. Despite continued positive news on the employment and vaccine distribution front, the Fed held the line on both short-term rates and its ongoing asset purchase plan. Federal Reserve officials forecast that they will keep the benchmark lending rate near zero until at least 2023 to help the U.S. economy recover from the pandemic. This appears to be a case of erring on the side of caution, maintaining as much accommodation as possible and combining it with ongoing stimulus despite widespread upgrades for growth and employment. Specific to the ongoing asset purchase program, Federal Reserve Chair Powell stated that it was not yet

time to start talking about tapering, putting to rest any expectations for a tapering of the monthly purchases of \$80 billion in U.S. Treasury debt and \$40 billion in mortgage-backed securities. Concerns about inflation were put aside with the Fed continuing to reinforce its comfort with higher than historically average inflation. As year-over-year price comparisons begin to incorporate the beginning of the pandemic last year, expectations for transitory inflation have been well communicated by the Fed.

It is important to note that our portfolio works to provide yield for investors while focusing on the shorter end of fixed income markets. We believe there are opportunities to add incremental yield over the benchmark by investing in structured product across the quality spectrum. The portfolio strives to maintain an average credit quality rating of A/BBB while taking advantage of mispriced opportunities in both unrated securities and an allocation to below investment grade securities.

As of March 31, the portfolio had a yield-to-worst (YTW) of 2.37% with an effective duration of 1.13, compared to the previous quarter end's YTW of 2.44% and effective duration of 1.20. The ongoing decrease in yield can be attributed to the significant rebound in pricing across the asset-backed securities (ABS) and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) markets that began in the latter part of 2020 and continued into January of this year. The ABS sector remains the largest allocation in the portfolio and was the strongest contributor to performance of the portfolio over the benchmark.

Within the securitized sector, ABS delivered the strongest performance followed by non-agency CMBS. Within the ABS sector, deals backed by small business loans were the strongest performers, as these securities continued to rebound from distressed pricing last year, which was driven by market technicals and not fundamental concerns. Securities backed by unsecured consumer securitizations worked equally as well as small business loans during the quarter. Non-agency CMBS delivered some of the strongest returns in Q1 as these securities carried their late 2020 rally into the beginning of 2021. The portfolio's overweight position relative to the benchmark contributed to performance as the sector delivered strong returns in Q1.

We continue to search for opportunities in the marketplace while maintaining an attractive yield relative to the benchmark.

Diamond Hill Short Duration Securitized Bond Strategy

As of March 31, 2021

PERIOD AND ANNUALIZED TOTAL RETURNS

Inception Date: July 31, 2016

	SINCE INCEPTION	3-YR	1-YR	YTD	1Q21
SHORT DURATION SECURITIZED BOND COMPOSITE					
Gross of Fees	4.33	4.55	13.88	1.65	1.65
Net of Fees	3.97	4.19	13.49	1.56	1.56
BENCHMARK					
Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Yr. Gov./Credit Index	2.00	3.04	1.57	-0.04	-0.04

CALENDAR YEAR RETURNS (%)

	7/31/16 - 12/31/16	2017	2018	2019	2020
SHORT DURATION SECURITIZED BOND COMPOSITE					
Gross of Fees	0.88	4.90	3.77	5.34	3.65
Net of Fees	0.73	4.53	3.41	4.97	3.29
BENCHMARK					
Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Yr. Gov./Credit Index	-0.38	0.84	1.60	4.03	3.33

Diamond Hill Capital Management Inc. (DHCM) claims compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®) and has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the GIPS Standards. DHCM has been independently verified for the period 5/31/00 – 12/31/20. The verification report(s) is/are available upon request. A firm that claims compliance with the GIPS standards must establish policies and procedures for complying with all the applicable requirements of the GIPS standards. Verification provides assurance on whether the firm's policies and procedures related to composite and pooled fund maintenance, as well as the calculation, presentation, and distribution of performance, have been designed in compliance with the GIPS standards and have been implemented on a firm-wide basis. Verification does not provide assurance on the accuracy of any specific performance report. DHCM is a registered investment adviser and wholly owned subsidiary of Diamond Hill Investment Group, Inc.; registration does not imply a certain level of skill or training. DHCM provides investment management services to individuals and institutions through mutual funds and separate accounts. A complete list and description of all composites and policies for valuing investments, calculating performance and preparing GIPS reports are available upon request. In addition, a list of broadly distributed pooled funds is available upon request. The Short Duration Securitized Bond Composite is comprised of discretionary non-fee and fee paying non-wrap accounts with a market value over \$200M managed according to the firm's Short Duration Securitized Bond fixed income strategy. The strategy's investment objective is to maximize total return with the preservation of capital. The strategy generally invests in a diversified portfolio of investment grade, fixed income securities, including bonds, debt securities and other similar U.S. dollar-denominated instruments issued by various U.S. public or private-sector entities, by foreign corporations or U.S. affiliates of foreign corporations or by foreign governments or their agencies and instrumentalities. The strategy may invest a significant portion or all of its assets in asset-backed, mortgage-related and mortgage-backed securities at the discretion of DHCM. The portfolio may invest up to 20% of its assets in below-investment grade securities at the time of purchase and will typically maintain an average portfolio duration of less than three. The composite results reflect the reinvestment of dividends, capital gains, and other earnings when appropriate. Composite returns and benchmark returns are presented gross of withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains. Returns are calculated using U.S. Dollars. Net returns are calculated by reducing the gross returns by either the actual client fee paid or the highest stated fee in the composite fee schedule, depending on the type of client and account, and are reduced by estimated accrued performance based fees where applicable. Only transaction costs are deducted from gross of fees returns. The Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Yr. Gov./Credit Index is an unmanaged index of investment grade government and corporate bonds with maturities of one to three years. Our selection process may lead to portfolios that differ markedly from the benchmarks presented. Returns may be more volatile than, and/ or may not be correlated to these indices, which are for comparative purposes only. The Firm's standard fee schedule for Short Duration Securitized Bond separate accounts is as follows: First \$200,000,000 = 0.45%; Next \$200,000,000 = 0.35%. The dispersion measure is the asset weighted standard deviation of the annual portfolio returns. Only portfolios represented in the

AS OF YEAR-END	DHCM	SHORT DURATION SECURITIZED BOND COMPOSITE			3-YR ANNUALIZED STANDARD DEVIATION (GROSS OF FEES)	
		Assets Under Management	Number of Accounts	Dispersion (Gross of Fees)	Short Duration Securitized Bond Composite	Bloomberg Barclays U.S. 1-3 Yr. Gov./Credit Index
2020	\$26.4B	5 or fewer	\$1.1B	NA ¹	5.98%	0.98%
2019	23.4B	5 or fewer	808.7M	NA ¹	0.64	0.92
2018	19.1B	5 or fewer	579.3M	NA ¹	NA ²	NA ²
2017	22.3B	5 or fewer	312.9M	NA ¹	NA ²	NA ²
2016	19.4B	5 or fewer	197.5M	NA ¹	NA ²	NA ²

composite for the entire year are included in the calculation. The calculation is not performed if the composite contains 5 or fewer accounts for the full year. No alteration of composites as presented here has occurred because of changes in personnel at any time. **Past performance is not a guarantee of future results.** GIPS® is a registered trademark of CFA Institute. CFA Institute does not endorse or promote this organization, nor does it warrant the accuracy or quality of the content contained herein. Index data source: Bloomberg Index Services Limited. See diamond-hill.com/disclosures for a full copy of the disclaimer. Analytics provided by The Yield Book® Software.

¹ NA = Not Applicable

² Statistics are not presented because 36 monthly returns are not available. This composite was created in July 2016.

